W
warewithall2/gage
Hand work between AI agents without handing over trust.
★ 1·更新 2026-11-15
在 GitHub 查看 ↗直链 · 无中转页
我们没有从该仓库取到可核对的安装命令,也没有公开的远端端点。这两样都没有时,我们不出配置——编一条出来比不给更糟。 各客户端的接法 →
- ★ 数取值
- 1 ★ · warewithall2/gage · 取自 GitHub 搜索 API · (2026-11-19 20:00:48 核对)
- 来源明细
- 收录自 punkpeye/awesome-mcp-servers 榜单(我们从中收集的条目之一) · 条目类型:MCP 服务
- 收录与活跃
- 收录于 2026-11-18 · 最近见到 2026-11-20 · 共见到 3 次 · 被 3 个来源列出
- 评分构成
- 综合分 300 · 1 ★ · 3 个来源 · mcp
常见问题(答案都来自我们的记录)
它适合谁 / 用来做什么?
我们把它归在这些标签下: MCP 服务。标签来自条目自身,不是我们强加的分类。
谁维护它、还在更新吗?
仓库
warewithall2/gage;我们收录于 2026-11-18;最近见到 2026-11-20。这里没有"官方认证"或"质量评级"——我们只记录来源与时间。README 原文(英文,未翻译) · 在 GitHub 读完整 README →
# gage
以下摘录自该仓库的 README(片段)
Hand work between AI agents without handing over trust.
Your Claude hands a task to Codex. A colleague's agent sends you their project
state. Normally nothing on the receiving end says who wrote it, or whether you
have ever confirmed that person — and an agent reading its inbox is not a human
reading email. A human who reads a phishing message is not executing it; an
agent is. A channel that lets one LLM send prompts to another is, by default,
a prompt-injection delivery network.
gage is that channel built the other way round. It is three things:
A bundle — files, a prompt and decisions in a signed, sealed directory.
A list you control. Two people compare four word-pairs over a channel
neither machine controls, and gage confirm records that they did. A key
nobody has confirmed still works and says so — SENDER ON YOUR LIST,
UNCONFIRMED — because being on a list and having been checked are two
different facts and only one of them is a claim about a person. Arrival is
not consent either: a bundle that lands in your inbox sits there unread
until you accept it. (A sealed file somebody hands you is the exception, and
the frame says so when you open one: pointing gage open at a directory is
itself the decision, and there is no gate behind it.)
A reading frame. Before any payload, the receiving agent is told that
this is data from an identified party carrying no authority — and when the
sender is not attributable under a key you currently accept, the contents
are withheld rather than annotated, because an annotation is something the
payload can argue with.
Every line of that recording is genuine output. The same capture is
docs/demo.md as annotated text and
docs/demo.cast in asciinema v2 format, and
scripts/demo.sh reproduces it in a throwaway directory
without touching your own gage home.
Try it:
curl -fsSL https://gage.sh/install.sh | sh # verifies its own checksum
gage quickstart
It works across vendors because it is not a protocol: a bundle is a signed
directory, so it moves over a shared folder, git, email, or anything else you
already have. There is a viewer (gage ui), machines find each other on a LAN
with no server in the middle (gage lan), and an agent can drive the whole
thing itself over MCP (gage mcp).
A gage is a pledge: something of value handed over to stand behind a promise,
and historically the glove thrown down to open a challenge. Both senses fit.
Everything downstream — every verdict, every grant, every unattended
acceptance — rests on that one human moment.
## "Why not just sign the payload yourself?"
Asked by a reviewer, and no document here answered it, which is a gap worth
closing because it is the first question anyone technical will have. Ed25519
is forty lines away in any language. If you want a signed handoff, sign the
tarball and send it.
What that gets you is authenticity. Every part of the gap between that and
this is a local decision the signature cannot make for you:
A signature says a key signed something. It does not say you ever agreed
to hear from that key. The verdict is computed from your allowlist, and
— since this release — from a record that a human compared four word-pairs
with its owner. "Valid signature" and "someone I have confirmed" are
Your Claude hands a task to Codex. A colleague's agent sends you their project
state. Normally nothing on the receiving end says who wrote it, or whether you
have ever confirmed that person — and an agent reading its inbox is not a human
reading email. A human who reads a phishing message is not executing it; an
agent is. A channel that lets one LLM send prompts to another is, by default,
a prompt-injection delivery network.
gage is that channel built the other way round. It is three things:
A bundle — files, a prompt and decisions in a signed, sealed directory.
A list you control. Two people compare four word-pairs over a channel
neither machine controls, and gage confirm records that they did. A key
nobody has confirmed still works and says so — SENDER ON YOUR LIST,
UNCONFIRMED — because being on a list and having been checked are two
different facts and only one of them is a claim about a person. Arrival is
not consent either: a bundle that lands in your inbox sits there unread
until you accept it. (A sealed file somebody hands you is the exception, and
the frame says so when you open one: pointing gage open at a directory is
itself the decision, and there is no gate behind it.)
A reading frame. Before any payload, the receiving agent is told that
this is data from an identified party carrying no authority — and when the
sender is not attributable under a key you currently accept, the contents
are withheld rather than annotated, because an annotation is something the
payload can argue with.
Every line of that recording is genuine output. The same capture is
docs/demo.md as annotated text and
docs/demo.cast in asciinema v2 format, and
scripts/demo.sh reproduces it in a throwaway directory
without touching your own gage home.
Try it:
curl -fsSL https://gage.sh/install.sh | sh # verifies its own checksum
gage quickstart
It works across vendors because it is not a protocol: a bundle is a signed
directory, so it moves over a shared folder, git, email, or anything else you
already have. There is a viewer (gage ui), machines find each other on a LAN
with no server in the middle (gage lan), and an agent can drive the whole
thing itself over MCP (gage mcp).
A gage is a pledge: something of value handed over to stand behind a promise,
and historically the glove thrown down to open a challenge. Both senses fit.
Everything downstream — every verdict, every grant, every unattended
acceptance — rests on that one human moment.
## "Why not just sign the payload yourself?"
Asked by a reviewer, and no document here answered it, which is a gap worth
closing because it is the first question anyone technical will have. Ed25519
is forty lines away in any language. If you want a signed handoff, sign the
tarball and send it.
What that gets you is authenticity. Every part of the gap between that and
this is a local decision the signature cannot make for you:
A signature says a key signed something. It does not say you ever agreed
to hear from that key. The verdict is computed from your allowlist, and
— since this release — from a record that a human compared four word-pairs
with its owner. "Valid signature" and "someone I have confirmed" are
收录徽章(可选)
想把收录标记放进 README 就复制这行,可选,不影响收录。
[](https://anclum.com/zh/s/warewithall2-gage/)
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