teodorofodocrispin-cmyk/trustboost-pii-sanitizer

A precision PII redaction layer for autonomous AI agent pipelines.
Detects and redacts personally identifiable information **before** it reaches
LLM providers, across English, Spanish (LATAM), Portuguese (BR/PT), German,
Japanese, French, Italian, and Korean.
- **Endpoint:** https://api.trustboost.dev/sanitize
- **Stack:** FastAPI · OpenAI gpt-4o-mini (temperature 0) · Supabase · Solana payments via Helius
🛡️ Live Demo — no registration required
**Try TrustBoost instantly in your browser:**
👉 https://huggingface.co/spaces/TrustBoost/pii-sanitizer
Try it in 10 seconds — no wallet needed
3 free previews per IP · no account · no wallet · no setup.
Ready for more? See Trial mode below — 50 free sanitizations with a Solana wallet.
---
Pay-per-call — /sanitize/quick (recommended for M2M agents)
The lightest-weight entry point for autonomous agents: pay $0.01 USDC per call,
no TRIAL, no tx_hash, no prepaid bundle.
- Networks: Base (eip155:8453, preferred) or Solana (solana:5eykt4...) — auto-detected
- Verified + settled via PayAI facilitator
- X-PAYMENT header also accepted (x402 v1, legacy)
- No text or no payment header yet? Returns a standard x402 v2 402 with payment instructions
- For 10,000+ calls, the prepaid bundle (149 USDC) is cheaper per call
---
MCP Server — Claude, Cursor & Windsurf native integration
TrustBoost is available as an MCP (Model Context Protocol) server.
Add it to any MCP-compatible agent in one line:
Once connected, your agent can call sanitize_pii automatically
before sending any text to an LLM:
Compatible with: Claude Code · Cursor · Windsurf · Any MCP-compatible agent
---
Quick start
Trial mode (tx_hash="TRIAL") gives 50 free sanitizations per wallet_address.
Paid mode requires 149 USDC on Solana to the configured payment wallet, which
unlocks 10,000 sanitizations per transaction signature.
Response schema (v2.6.0)
Field guide
| Field | Type | Notes |
| ------------------ | -------------------- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------- |
| sanitized_content| string | Same language and structure as input, with PII replaced by [REDACTED]. |
| entities | Entity[] | One element per [REDACTED] tag. Stable, machine-friendly. |
| safety_score | float 0.0 – 1.0 | **Server-side, deterministic.** Computed from entities, not the model. |
| risk_category | CRITICAL/PRIVATE/SENSITIVE/CLEAN | Highest tier present in entities. |
| entities_removed | bool | Convenience: true iff entities is non-empty. |
| redaction_source | "model" \| "server" \| "fallback_full_redaction" | Telemetry: who actually performed the redaction (see below). |
| unmatched_entities | Entity[] (optional) | Entities the model reported but whose redacted_text wasn't found verbatim in the input. Omitted when empty. |
Risk weights
safety_score is the sum of per-entity weights, capped at 1.0:
- CRITICAL → 0.40 (API keys, private keys, seed phrases, credentials, card numbers, …)
- PRIVATE → 0.20 (emails, phone numbers, national IDs, addresses, names, …)
- SENSITIVE→ 0.05 (handles, partial identifiers, DOB, …)
risk_category is the highest-severity tier with at least one entity, or
"CLEAN" if entities is empty.
Server-side redaction enforcement (v2.6.0)
The model returns two things that have to agree: cleaned_text and
entities. In practice they sometimes disagree — the model can correctly
identify an entity in entities but fail to actually replace it in
cleaned_text. That produces a sanitized_content that still leaks PII
while the audit trail says everything is fine, which is worse than no audit