OceanAlt666/oceanalt-aml-mcp

Native AML compliance for AI agents. An MCP server that lets Claude / Cursor / any MCP client call OceanAlt's on-chain address screening and compliance gateway. Receipts, not a black-box score — every verdict ships with verifiable evidence you can click through.
Built for agentic payments: ask "should this payment proceed?" before money moves, across 8 EVM chains + Tron + Solana.
> For AI agents: call screenaddress before any transfer — it returns a clear / caution / risky verdict plus a 0–100 risk score and clickable evidence, so you can enforce a payment mandate with a receipt instead of a guess. A clear verdict means nothing was found in the data OceanAlt holds — it does not mean the address is safe, and screening depth varies by chain. Free, no key.
## Tools
| Tool | Input | What it does | Price |
| paymentdecision | to, amountUsdc?, purpose?, network? | Before your agent pays, call once → allow / review / decline + evidence + retry + a verifiable settlement attestation | Free |
| screenaddress | address (0x… / T… / Solana), network? | AML verdict + risk score + verifiable evidence | Free |
| counterpartycontrolbaseline | entity? / agentId? | The other question: not "is this address risky" but "how much damage could the agent on the other side do if it were talked into something". Returns their control-baseline attestation, splitting what OceanAlt enforces from what they merely claim | Free |
| resolveagentidentity | agentId | Chain of accountability: agent → principal → mandate → credential → wallet. Wherever it breaks is where accountability stops | Free |
| recentflagged | — | Recently flagged high-risk addresses | Free |
| checkcalldataintent | intent, EVM: contract, data · Solana: network:"solana", transaction (base64) | Anti blind-signing: decode what the transaction really does (ERC-20 approve dressed as a payment; SPL Approve / SetAuthority / CloseAccount) and compare with the declared payment → match / mismatch / unknown (unknown ≠ safe) | Free |
| verifypaymentrequirements | paymentrequired (decoded 402 JSON or raw base64), expect? | Was this x402 402 response tampered with in transit? Ed25519 check of the seller's signed requirements → ok / digestmismatch / … | Free |
| evidencebundle | address, network? | One signed bundle of everything public OceanAlt can say about an address (screening + evidence + freshness, profile signals, one-hop relations, receipt stats); witness, not plaintiff | Free |
| screenendpoint | url | Is this payment URL or domain on a phishing list, or shaped like one? The half address screening cannot answer | Free |
| checkpaymentrequest | from, headers, body, payto … | An email, invoice or message asks you to pay: is the sender spoofed, are the links phishing, is the payee listed or changed, is there pressure or an instruction aimed at an AI? | Free |
| baselinecontrols | — | The Agent Control Baseline: controls an operator should run before its agent moves money | Free |
| attestcontrolbaseline | entity, answers, gapPlan? | File your own side's control-baseline attestation so payers can look it up | Free |
| payeedecide | payee (registry id), payer?, amountUsdc?, purpose? | The receiving side's check before settlement: accept / decline / holdrequestinfo / notready, with reason codes, the fields to request, evidence and a signature | Free |