M
murandido/mcp-wpp
Privacy-first WhatsApp MCP server: per-chat consent, encryption at rest, read-only by default, approval for every send.
★ 1·更新 2026-11-17
在 GitHub 查看 ↗链接已于 2026-11-17 核查 · HTTP 200 · 打开的是厂商自己的官网
装完之后怎么算装好了
- 装完该看到什么 — 命令正常结束时退出码为 0,终端里没有 "command not found" 或 "permission denied"。
- 一行自检 — 按该仓库 README 里给出的最小用法跑一次;能按 README 的描述输出就是通了。
- 答不出来怎么办 — 这个项目没有写排错说明,去仓库的 Issues 搜 install。
安装命令取自该仓库;以上判据只描述可观察到的结果,不替代项目自己的文档。
- ★ 数取值
- 1 ★ · murandido/mcp-wpp · 取自 GitHub 搜索 API · (2026-11-19 20:00:48 核对)
- 来源明细
- 从该仓库的 GitHub 页面直接读取 · 条目类型:开源项目
- 收录与活跃
- 收录于 2026-11-16 · 最近见到 2026-11-20 · 共见到 5 次 · 被 1 个来源列出
- 评分构成
- 综合分 103 · 1 ★ · 1 个来源 · repo
- 安装
- 安装命令见上方「安装与配置」。
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它适合谁 / 用来做什么?
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仓库
murandido/mcp-wpp;我们收录于 2026-11-16;最近见到 2026-11-20。这里没有"官方认证"或"质量评级"——我们只记录来源与时间。README 原文(英文,未翻译) · 在 GitHub 读完整 README →
# mcp-wpp
以下摘录自该仓库的 README(片段)
A privacy-first WhatsApp MCP server. Let an AI assistant read, search and summarise the chats you choose. The store is encrypted, the server is read-only unless you opt in, and nothing gets sent without your approval.
wpp-mcp links to your own WhatsApp account as a linked device (through whatsmeow), keeps a local encrypted cache, and exposes it to MCP clients such as Claude Code and Claude Desktop. It is a hardened fork of sealjay/mcp-whatsapp.
## Why another WhatsApp MCP?
Your WhatsApp history is some of the most personal data you have. Connecting it to an LLM combines the three ingredients of the lethal trifecta: private data, untrusted content (anyone can message you), and the ability to communicate externally. mcp-wpp is built around limiting each of them:
| Risk | What mcp-wpp does |
| The AI sees chats it has no business reading | Per-chat consent. Nothing is visible until you allow it. The AI can ask for a chat, and you approve or reject the request. Hidden chats behave exactly like chats that do not exist. |
| A malicious message tells the AI to send your data somewhere | Read-only by default. With -write, every send becomes a proposal you approve from the CLI or a web page. Access is checked again when the proposal runs. |
| Someone copies your disk, backup or container volume | Encryption at rest: SQLCipher for both databases and AES-256-GCM for cached media, keyed from a file you keep elsewhere. |
| Another program or web page talks to the daemon | Bearer token on every route, Host/Origin checks against DNS rebinding, an optional 0600 Unix socket, and a stdio bridge so clients never need a port or a token. |
| A token stored in a remote connector leaks | Client tokens for /mcp only: read-only by default, optionally limited to some chats and given an expiry, revocable at once. Only their hash is stored, and they never open the operator API. |
| You cannot tell what a client read or did | An audit log of every tool call, resource read and operator action (who, which tool, which chat, the outcome), without message text or arguments. wpp-mcp audit shows it. |
| A message forges other messages, or a pairing QR leaks to the model | Message bodies cannot start new lines that look like headers, results are labelled as third-party data, and pairing never goes through MCP. |
| Runaway sends get the number banned | Daemon-side rate limits that clients cannot bypass. |
Plus: accent-insensitive full-text search (nao finds não), a cross-chat digest tool, pairing by phone-number code, optional retention, local voice-note transcription, and a small default tool surface (12 read-only tools out of 49).
## Quick start
### Docker (recommended)
bash
git clone https://github.com/murandido/mcp-wpp.git && cd mcp-wpp
mkdir -p data secrets
(umask 077; docker run --rm ghcr.io/murandido/mcp-wpp:latest keygen -out - > secrets/wpp_mcp_key)
docker compose up -d
docker compose exec wpp-mcp wpp-mcp pair -phone +5511999999999 # type the code on your phone
docker compose exec wpp-mcp wpp-mcp access list # after the first sync
docker compose exec wpp-mcp wpp-mcp access allow "Family"
> Back up secrets/wpp_mcp_key. Without it data/ cannot be read, and nobody can recover it.
wpp-mcp links to your own WhatsApp account as a linked device (through whatsmeow), keeps a local encrypted cache, and exposes it to MCP clients such as Claude Code and Claude Desktop. It is a hardened fork of sealjay/mcp-whatsapp.
## Why another WhatsApp MCP?
Your WhatsApp history is some of the most personal data you have. Connecting it to an LLM combines the three ingredients of the lethal trifecta: private data, untrusted content (anyone can message you), and the ability to communicate externally. mcp-wpp is built around limiting each of them:
| Risk | What mcp-wpp does |
| The AI sees chats it has no business reading | Per-chat consent. Nothing is visible until you allow it. The AI can ask for a chat, and you approve or reject the request. Hidden chats behave exactly like chats that do not exist. |
| A malicious message tells the AI to send your data somewhere | Read-only by default. With -write, every send becomes a proposal you approve from the CLI or a web page. Access is checked again when the proposal runs. |
| Someone copies your disk, backup or container volume | Encryption at rest: SQLCipher for both databases and AES-256-GCM for cached media, keyed from a file you keep elsewhere. |
| Another program or web page talks to the daemon | Bearer token on every route, Host/Origin checks against DNS rebinding, an optional 0600 Unix socket, and a stdio bridge so clients never need a port or a token. |
| A token stored in a remote connector leaks | Client tokens for /mcp only: read-only by default, optionally limited to some chats and given an expiry, revocable at once. Only their hash is stored, and they never open the operator API. |
| You cannot tell what a client read or did | An audit log of every tool call, resource read and operator action (who, which tool, which chat, the outcome), without message text or arguments. wpp-mcp audit shows it. |
| A message forges other messages, or a pairing QR leaks to the model | Message bodies cannot start new lines that look like headers, results are labelled as third-party data, and pairing never goes through MCP. |
| Runaway sends get the number banned | Daemon-side rate limits that clients cannot bypass. |
Plus: accent-insensitive full-text search (nao finds não), a cross-chat digest tool, pairing by phone-number code, optional retention, local voice-note transcription, and a small default tool surface (12 read-only tools out of 49).
## Quick start
### Docker (recommended)
bash
git clone https://github.com/murandido/mcp-wpp.git && cd mcp-wpp
mkdir -p data secrets
(umask 077; docker run --rm ghcr.io/murandido/mcp-wpp:latest keygen -out - > secrets/wpp_mcp_key)
docker compose up -d
docker compose exec wpp-mcp wpp-mcp pair -phone +5511999999999 # type the code on your phone
docker compose exec wpp-mcp wpp-mcp access list # after the first sync
docker compose exec wpp-mcp wpp-mcp access allow "Family"
> Back up secrets/wpp_mcp_key. Without it data/ cannot be read, and nobody can recover it.
收录徽章(可选)
想把收录标记放进 README 就复制这行,可选,不影响收录。
[](https://anclum.com/zh/s/murandido-mcp-wpp/)
- 来源
- github · https://github.com/murandido/mcp-wpp
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