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chrbailey/promptspeak-mcp-server

chrbailey/promptspeak-mcp-server

Pre-execution governance for AI agents. Sub-millisecond tool call validation, drift detection, circuit breakers, human-in-the-loop holds. 829 tests. 56 MCP tools.
在 GitHub 查看 ↗直链 · 无中转页
配置模板(请按你的客户端调整)
claude mcp add promptspeak-mcp-server -- npx -y promptspeak-mcp-server
这是根据仓库名生成的可粘贴骨架,命令行参数与包名请以该项目 README 为准。
★ 数取值
1 ★ · chrbailey/promptspeak-mcp-server · 取自 GitHub 搜索 API · (2026-10-16 20:00:20 核对)
来源明细
收录自 punkpeye/awesome-mcp-servers 榜单(我们从中收集的条目之一) · 条目类型:MCP 服务
收录与活跃
收录于 2026-10-09 · 最近见到 2026-10-16 · 共见到 32 次 · 被 7 个来源列出
评分构成
综合分 703 · 1 ★ · 7 个来源 · mcp
常见问题(答案都来自我们的记录)
怎么安装?
我们【没有】从该仓库取到安装命令(我们的 install 覆盖率只有约 4%)。请看它的 README 或 releases 页。
它适合谁 / 用来做什么?
我们把它归在这些标签下: MCP 服务。标签来自条目自身,不是我们强加的分类。
谁维护它、还在更新吗?
仓库 chrbailey/promptspeak-mcp-server;我们收录于 2026-10-09;最近见到 2026-10-16。这里没有"官方认证"或"质量评级"——我们只记录来源与时间。
第三方质量标记

promptspeak-mcp-server

以下摘录自该仓库的 README(片段) · 在 GitHub 读完整 README →

**Pre-execution governance for AI agents. Blocks dangerous tool calls before they execute.**
AI agents call tools (file writes, API requests, shell commands) with no validation layer between intent and execution. A prompt injection, hallucinated argument, or drifting goal can trigger irreversible actions. PromptSpeak intercepts every MCP tool call, validates it against deterministic rules, and blocks or holds risky operations for human approval — in 0.1ms, before anything executes.
When to use this
- You run AI agents that call tools (MCP servers, function calling, tool use) and need a governance layer between the agent and the tools.
- You need human-in-the-loop approval for high-risk operations (production deployments, financial transactions, legal filings).
- You want to detect behavioral drift — an agent gradually shifting away from its assigned task.
- You need an audit trail of every tool call an agent attempted, whether it was allowed or blocked.
- You operate in a regulated domain (legal, financial, healthcare) where agent actions must be deterministically constrained.
Install
Claude Code
Add to ~/.claude/settings.json (or project-level .claude/settings.json):
Restart Claude Code. All 56 governance tools are immediately available.
Claude Desktop
Add to claude_desktop_config.json:
As a library
From source
Usage examples
1. Validate a governance frame
Validate that a PromptSpeak frame is structurally and semantically correct before using it. Frames encode governance constraints as symbol sequences — mode first, then domain, action, and entity.
Invalid frames return actionable suggestions:
2. Hold queue workflow — human-in-the-loop approval
When an agent attempts a risky operation (high drift score, low confidence, security finding), the action is held for human review instead of executing. This is the full hold lifecycle: list, inspect, approve or reject.
**Step 1: List pending holds**
**Step 2: Approve with modifications (or reject)**
To reject instead:
3. Security scanning — catch vulnerabilities before execution
Scan code content for security issues before an agent writes it to disk. Critical findings block execution; high-severity findings are held for human review.
Use ps_security_gate instead of ps_security_scan to enforce the policy — it blocks on critical, holds high-severity for human review, and warns on medium:
How it works: 9-stage validation pipeline
Every tool call passes through this pipeline. If any stage fails, execution is blocked.
Stages 1-6 are **pre-execution** — the tool never runs if any check fails. Stages 8-9 are **post-execution** — they detect drift and can halt the agent for future calls.
Security scanning
When an agent writes code (write_file, edit_file, create_file, patch_file), the content is scanned against 10 detection patterns before execution. Severity determines enforcement:
| Severity | Enforcement | What it catches |
|----------|-------------|-----------------|
| **CRITICAL** | **Blocked** — execution denied | SQL injection via template literals, hardcoded API keys/passwords/tokens |
| **HIGH** | **Held** — queued for human review | Security-related TODOs, logging sensitive data, insecure defaults (cors(), 0.0.0.0, debug: true) |
| **MEDIUM** | **Warned** — logged, execution continues | Empty catch blocks, hedging comments ("probably works"), disabled tests |
| **LOW** | **Logged** — no enforcement | DROP TABLE, rm -rf (flagged for awareness) |
What works (tested)
All claims below are backed by passing tests (104 tests across 5 test files):
- **Pattern detection works.** Each of the 10 patterns is tested for true positives AND false positives. Example: api_key = "sk-1234567890abcdef" is caught; API_KEY = process.env.API_KEY is not. SQL injection catches \SELECT * FROM users WHERE id = ${id}\ but not parameterized queries (db.query("SELECT * FROM users WHERE id = ?", [id])).
- **Severity enforcement works.** Critical findings block execution. High findings hold for review. Medium findings warn but allow. Tested end-to-end through the interceptor pipeline.
来源
awesome · https://github.com/chrbailey/promptspeak-mcp-server
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