A
AIops-tools/Proxy-AIops
Governed AI-ops for Traefik + Caddy + HAProxy reverse proxies / load balancers: routes, services, up
SECURITY.md ✓
在 GitHub 查看 ↗链接已于 2026-11-12 核查 · HTTP 200 · 打开的是厂商自己的官网
安装与配置
- 复制上面的命令
- 粘成
claude_desktop_config.json里mcpServers的一项（本地服务器用 command + args，示例见 客户端接法） - 重启客户端
客户端配置（取自该仓库的安装命令）
{
"mcpServers": {
"aiops-tools-proxy-aiops": {
"command": "uv",
"args": ["tool", "install", "proxy-aiops"]
}
}
}解析自我们于 2026-10-26 抓取的该仓库 README；我们未执行过。
command/args 来自仓库写明的安装命令；不确定时请以该项目 README 为准。
VS Code（.vscode/mcp.json —— 键名是 servers）
{
"servers": {
"aiops-tools-proxy-aiops": {
"command": "uv",
"args": ["tool", "install", "proxy-aiops"]
}
}
}VS Code 顶层键是 <code>servers</code>，其余与上面那份相同。
Claude Code（命令行）
claude mcp add --transport stdio aiops-tools-proxy-aiops -- uv tool install proxy-aiops
Claude Code 不收 JSON 文件，用这条命令直接加。
配置项的键名以你的客户端为准：客户端与 CLI
- ★ 数取值
- 0 ★ · AIops-tools/Proxy-AIops · 取自 GitHub 搜索 API · （2026-11-13 20:00:50 核对）
- 来源明细
- 收录自 punkpeye/awesome-mcp-servers 榜单（我们从中收集的条目之一） · 条目类型：MCP 服务
- 收录与活跃
- 收录于 2026-10-23 · 最近见到 2026-11-14 · 共见到 26 次 · 被 23 个来源列出
- 评分构成
- 综合分 2,300 · 23 个来源 · mcp
- 安装
uv tool install proxy-aiops
常见问题（答案都来自我们的记录）
怎么安装？
该仓库给出的安装命令是
uv tool install proxy-aiops。我们的记录里它是仓库自己提供的；不保证在你的客户端上直接可用。它适合谁 / 用来做什么？
我们把它归在这些标签下: MCP 服务。标签来自条目自身，不是我们强加的分类。
谁维护它、还在更新吗？
仓库
AIops-tools/Proxy-AIops；我们收录于 2026-10-23；最近见到 2026-11-14。这里没有"官方认证"或"质量评级"——我们只记录来源与时间。# Proxy AIops
以下摘录自该仓库的 README（片段） · 在 GitHub 读完整 README →
Governed, audited AI-ops for Traefik, Caddy and HAProxy reverse proxies / load balancers — for AI agents (via MCP) and humans (via CLI).
> Disclaimer: Community-maintained open-source project. Not affiliated with, endorsed by, or sponsored by Traefik Labs, the Caddy project, HAProxy Technologies, or the HAProxy project. Traefik, Caddy and HAProxy are trademarks of their respective owners. MIT licensed.
proxy-aiops speaks to three proxy platforms behind one MCP server — Traefik
(its API under /api/..., metrics-text counters via /metrics), Caddy (the
admin API, default localhost:2019) and HAProxy (the Data Plane API v2 under
/v2/..., HTTP Basic auth) — with the same tools working on all three. Each
target in the config names its own platform; a name-keyed platform registry
selects the API shape (auth + resource paths), and an explicit support matrix
raises teaching errors for ops a platform genuinely cannot do — e.g. Traefik
writes point you at its providers (file, container labels, orchestrator CRDs), never
a silent no-op.
Every tool runs through a built-in governance harness (vendored, zero external
dependency): audit log, token/call budget with runaway circuit-breaker,
descriptive risk-tier labelling, undo-token recording, and output sanitisation.
## Why this exists
One server, three proxies — Traefik, Caddy and HAProxy in a mixed edge,
spoken to through identical tool names. Adding another proxy later is a new
platform descriptor, not a rewrite.
Read the whole edge — version, entrypoints/listeners, routes (routers /
caddy routes / frontends) with parsed hosts+paths, services and server-level
upstream health, middlewares, TLS domain inventory, traffic/error counters,
and the live config tree (snapshot + search).
Flagship RCA analyses — transparent heuristics that show their numbers,
never a black-box verdict: backendhealthrca (down upstreams → cause class
L4/L6/L7/DNS/maint + action), certexpirysweep (days-to-expiry buckets +
per-platform renewal hints), errorraterca (5xx share vs the fleet
baseline, dominant code → 502/503/504/500 cause), and
routeconflictanalysis (shadowed routes, dead routes, redirect loops).
Governed writes — caddy config set / delete / full load (the prior
subtree/config is fetched first, so the recorded undo replays a real restore)
and haproxy runtime server state (ready/drain/maint) and weight (undo
restores the prior value) — all with dryrun previews; delete/load are
risk=high with double confirmation at the CLI.
## What this tool does, and does not, decide
It delivers proxy operations — reads and writes — accurately and efficiently,
and records every one of them. It does not decide whether a write is allowed
to happen. That is the agent's judgement, or the permission of the account you
connect it with: give the HAProxy Data Plane API a read-only role, or scope down
the Traefik/Caddy admin API you point it at, and the writes fail at the server —
the place that actually owns the permission.
So there is no read-only switch, no policy file, no approval gate to configure.
The one thing the tool guarantees is that nothing is silent: every call, over
MCP and over the CLI alike, lands an audit row in ~/.proxy-aiops/audit.db,
> Disclaimer: Community-maintained open-source project. Not affiliated with, endorsed by, or sponsored by Traefik Labs, the Caddy project, HAProxy Technologies, or the HAProxy project. Traefik, Caddy and HAProxy are trademarks of their respective owners. MIT licensed.
proxy-aiops speaks to three proxy platforms behind one MCP server — Traefik
(its API under /api/..., metrics-text counters via /metrics), Caddy (the
admin API, default localhost:2019) and HAProxy (the Data Plane API v2 under
/v2/..., HTTP Basic auth) — with the same tools working on all three. Each
target in the config names its own platform; a name-keyed platform registry
selects the API shape (auth + resource paths), and an explicit support matrix
raises teaching errors for ops a platform genuinely cannot do — e.g. Traefik
writes point you at its providers (file, container labels, orchestrator CRDs), never
a silent no-op.
Every tool runs through a built-in governance harness (vendored, zero external
dependency): audit log, token/call budget with runaway circuit-breaker,
descriptive risk-tier labelling, undo-token recording, and output sanitisation.
## Why this exists
One server, three proxies — Traefik, Caddy and HAProxy in a mixed edge,
spoken to through identical tool names. Adding another proxy later is a new
platform descriptor, not a rewrite.
Read the whole edge — version, entrypoints/listeners, routes (routers /
caddy routes / frontends) with parsed hosts+paths, services and server-level
upstream health, middlewares, TLS domain inventory, traffic/error counters,
and the live config tree (snapshot + search).
Flagship RCA analyses — transparent heuristics that show their numbers,
never a black-box verdict: backendhealthrca (down upstreams → cause class
L4/L6/L7/DNS/maint + action), certexpirysweep (days-to-expiry buckets +
per-platform renewal hints), errorraterca (5xx share vs the fleet
baseline, dominant code → 502/503/504/500 cause), and
routeconflictanalysis (shadowed routes, dead routes, redirect loops).
Governed writes — caddy config set / delete / full load (the prior
subtree/config is fetched first, so the recorded undo replays a real restore)
and haproxy runtime server state (ready/drain/maint) and weight (undo
restores the prior value) — all with dryrun previews; delete/load are
risk=high with double confirmation at the CLI.
## What this tool does, and does not, decide
It delivers proxy operations — reads and writes — accurately and efficiently,
and records every one of them. It does not decide whether a write is allowed
to happen. That is the agent's judgement, or the permission of the account you
connect it with: give the HAProxy Data Plane API a read-only role, or scope down
the Traefik/Caddy admin API you point it at, and the writes fail at the server —
the place that actually owns the permission.
So there is no read-only switch, no policy file, no approval gate to configure.
The one thing the tool guarantees is that nothing is silent: every call, over
MCP and over the CLI alike, lands an audit row in ~/.proxy-aiops/audit.db,
收录徽章（可选）
想把收录标记放进 README 就复制这行，可选，不影响收录。
[](https://anclum.com/zh/s/aiops-tools-proxy-aiops/)
- 来源
- awesome · https://github.com/AIops-tools/Proxy-AIops
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