M
murandido/mcp-wpp
Privacy-first WhatsApp MCP server: per-chat consent, encryption at rest, read-only by default, approval for every send.
★ 1·updated 2026-11-17
View on GitHub ↗Link checked 2026-11-17 · HTTP 200 · opens the vendor's own site
After install: how to tell it works
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- One-line self-check — Run the smallest usage example from that repository's README. If the output matches what the README describes, it is working.
- If that does not work — This project has no troubleshooting notes. Search its issues for "install".
The install command comes from the repository; these checks describe observable results only and do not replace the project's own docs.
- Star count
- 1 ★ · murandido/mcp-wpp · read from the GitHub search API · (checked 2026-11-19 20:00:48)
- Source
- read directly from its GitHub page · type: open-source project
- Harvest history
- first seen 2026-11-16 · last seen 2026-11-20 · seen 5× · listed by 1 sources
- Score
- score 103 · 1 ★ · 1 sources · repo
- Install
- see Install & config above
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repository
murandido/mcp-wpp;first catalogued 2026-11-16;last seen 2026-11-20。There is no official certification or quality rating here — we record sources and dates only.README excerpt (English, untranslated) · Read the full README on GitHub →
# mcp-wpp
Excerpted from the repository README (abridged)
A privacy-first WhatsApp MCP server. Let an AI assistant read, search and summarise the chats you choose. The store is encrypted, the server is read-only unless you opt in, and nothing gets sent without your approval.
wpp-mcp links to your own WhatsApp account as a linked device (through whatsmeow), keeps a local encrypted cache, and exposes it to MCP clients such as Claude Code and Claude Desktop. It is a hardened fork of sealjay/mcp-whatsapp.
## Why another WhatsApp MCP?
Your WhatsApp history is some of the most personal data you have. Connecting it to an LLM combines the three ingredients of the lethal trifecta: private data, untrusted content (anyone can message you), and the ability to communicate externally. mcp-wpp is built around limiting each of them:
| Risk | What mcp-wpp does |
| The AI sees chats it has no business reading | Per-chat consent. Nothing is visible until you allow it. The AI can ask for a chat, and you approve or reject the request. Hidden chats behave exactly like chats that do not exist. |
| A malicious message tells the AI to send your data somewhere | Read-only by default. With -write, every send becomes a proposal you approve from the CLI or a web page. Access is checked again when the proposal runs. |
| Someone copies your disk, backup or container volume | Encryption at rest: SQLCipher for both databases and AES-256-GCM for cached media, keyed from a file you keep elsewhere. |
| Another program or web page talks to the daemon | Bearer token on every route, Host/Origin checks against DNS rebinding, an optional 0600 Unix socket, and a stdio bridge so clients never need a port or a token. |
| A token stored in a remote connector leaks | Client tokens for /mcp only: read-only by default, optionally limited to some chats and given an expiry, revocable at once. Only their hash is stored, and they never open the operator API. |
| You cannot tell what a client read or did | An audit log of every tool call, resource read and operator action (who, which tool, which chat, the outcome), without message text or arguments. wpp-mcp audit shows it. |
| A message forges other messages, or a pairing QR leaks to the model | Message bodies cannot start new lines that look like headers, results are labelled as third-party data, and pairing never goes through MCP. |
| Runaway sends get the number banned | Daemon-side rate limits that clients cannot bypass. |
Plus: accent-insensitive full-text search (nao finds não), a cross-chat digest tool, pairing by phone-number code, optional retention, local voice-note transcription, and a small default tool surface (12 read-only tools out of 49).
## Quick start
### Docker (recommended)
bash
git clone https://github.com/murandido/mcp-wpp.git && cd mcp-wpp
mkdir -p data secrets
(umask 077; docker run --rm ghcr.io/murandido/mcp-wpp:latest keygen -out - > secrets/wpp_mcp_key)
docker compose up -d
docker compose exec wpp-mcp wpp-mcp pair -phone +5511999999999 # type the code on your phone
docker compose exec wpp-mcp wpp-mcp access list # after the first sync
docker compose exec wpp-mcp wpp-mcp access allow "Family"
> Back up secrets/wpp_mcp_key. Without it data/ cannot be read, and nobody can recover it.
wpp-mcp links to your own WhatsApp account as a linked device (through whatsmeow), keeps a local encrypted cache, and exposes it to MCP clients such as Claude Code and Claude Desktop. It is a hardened fork of sealjay/mcp-whatsapp.
## Why another WhatsApp MCP?
Your WhatsApp history is some of the most personal data you have. Connecting it to an LLM combines the three ingredients of the lethal trifecta: private data, untrusted content (anyone can message you), and the ability to communicate externally. mcp-wpp is built around limiting each of them:
| Risk | What mcp-wpp does |
| The AI sees chats it has no business reading | Per-chat consent. Nothing is visible until you allow it. The AI can ask for a chat, and you approve or reject the request. Hidden chats behave exactly like chats that do not exist. |
| A malicious message tells the AI to send your data somewhere | Read-only by default. With -write, every send becomes a proposal you approve from the CLI or a web page. Access is checked again when the proposal runs. |
| Someone copies your disk, backup or container volume | Encryption at rest: SQLCipher for both databases and AES-256-GCM for cached media, keyed from a file you keep elsewhere. |
| Another program or web page talks to the daemon | Bearer token on every route, Host/Origin checks against DNS rebinding, an optional 0600 Unix socket, and a stdio bridge so clients never need a port or a token. |
| A token stored in a remote connector leaks | Client tokens for /mcp only: read-only by default, optionally limited to some chats and given an expiry, revocable at once. Only their hash is stored, and they never open the operator API. |
| You cannot tell what a client read or did | An audit log of every tool call, resource read and operator action (who, which tool, which chat, the outcome), without message text or arguments. wpp-mcp audit shows it. |
| A message forges other messages, or a pairing QR leaks to the model | Message bodies cannot start new lines that look like headers, results are labelled as third-party data, and pairing never goes through MCP. |
| Runaway sends get the number banned | Daemon-side rate limits that clients cannot bypass. |
Plus: accent-insensitive full-text search (nao finds não), a cross-chat digest tool, pairing by phone-number code, optional retention, local voice-note transcription, and a small default tool surface (12 read-only tools out of 49).
## Quick start
### Docker (recommended)
bash
git clone https://github.com/murandido/mcp-wpp.git && cd mcp-wpp
mkdir -p data secrets
(umask 077; docker run --rm ghcr.io/murandido/mcp-wpp:latest keygen -out - > secrets/wpp_mcp_key)
docker compose up -d
docker compose exec wpp-mcp wpp-mcp pair -phone +5511999999999 # type the code on your phone
docker compose exec wpp-mcp wpp-mcp access list # after the first sync
docker compose exec wpp-mcp wpp-mcp access allow "Family"
> Back up secrets/wpp_mcp_key. Without it data/ cannot be read, and nobody can recover it.
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