H
holistis/tokenizen
Nederlandse versie / Dutch version: README.nl.md
updated 2026-11-18
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We have neither an install command nor a public remote endpoint from this repository, so we do not print a config. A made-up one is worse than none. How each client wires MCP up →
- Source
- collected from the punkpeye/awesome-mcp-servers list · type: MCP server
- Harvest history
- first seen 2026-11-18 · last seen 2026-11-20 · seen 3× · listed by 3 sources
- Score
- score 300 · 3 sources · mcp
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holistis/tokenizen;first catalogued 2026-11-18;last seen 2026-11-20。There is no official certification or quality rating here — we record sources and dates only.README excerpt (English, untranslated) · Read the full README on GitHub →
# tokenizen
Excerpted from the repository README (abridged)
Nederlandse versie / Dutch version: README.nl.md
Signed, content-addressed records of what an agent delivered, checkable by another agent without a human in the loop. Two of the packages here are MCP servers, so an agent can write and read these records as tools.
### What the buyer can check, and what he cannot
An agent buys 8 hours of GPU capacity from another agent and pays over x402. The money settles. Today the trail stops there, and whatever the buying agent learned dies with its session.
With a delivery claim, the buyer leaves behind a signed record: 28,800 seconds promised, 25,230 delivered, hashed to its own content so it cannot be edited afterwards. The next agent can pull that history before paying the same seller.
What a later reader can check: that this record is the one that was signed, by that key, about that exact delivered amount, and that nobody edited it afterwards.
What he cannot check: whether 25,230 is true. A signature proves origin and integrity, never truth. This is a delivery slip, not a verdict, and the whole design follows from that line.
## Three things in the box
The example above is one of three. All three leave a record that someone else can check:
A signed delivery claim the buyer leaves behind after settlement, including the gap between what was promised and what arrived, hashed to its own content so it cannot be edited after the fact.
A time-bounded attestation about a network endpoint, issued only after the operator has proved it controls that endpoint.
Verifiers and signed test vectors, so anyone can check a claim against an independent implementation instead of trusting ours.
No reputation score, no judgment, no financial instrument. A delivery slip, not a verdict.
## Call it
There is a live endpoint. It answers 402 with signed offers in the Payment-Required header, and issues an EIP-712 receipt after settlement, under the x402 offer-and-receipt extension.
bash
curl -i -X POST https://api.tokenizen.nl/api/paid/verify-ownership \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{"endpoint":"https://api.tokenizen.nl/sse","ownerAddress":"0x1111111111111111111111111111111111111111","method":"dns-txt"}'
The offers are in the header, not the body. Base64-decode it, recover the signature against the domain {name: "x402 offer", version: "1", chainId: 1}, then check that the recovered key is allowed to speak for the host, which the specification treats as a separate question:
bash
dig +short TXT _controllers.tokenizen.nl
"v=1;controller=did:pkh:eip155:1:0x4E1174b774643B6AD9EE966A81ea1e3665D1159a"
Same key. Two commands, no trust in us required.
It runs on Base Sepolia, so the money is test money and the cryptography is not. If you are implementing the client side of that extension, this gives you a live signed artifact instead of a fixture you wrote yourself and therefore cannot be surprised by.
Two honest limits. The transaction field in those receipts is empty, so a receipt cannot name its own settlement; that is an upstream bug we traced and filed, with the fix open as x402#3826. And every payment through it so far has been ours on both sides, which proves the chain runs and proves nothing about adoption.
Signed, content-addressed records of what an agent delivered, checkable by another agent without a human in the loop. Two of the packages here are MCP servers, so an agent can write and read these records as tools.
### What the buyer can check, and what he cannot
An agent buys 8 hours of GPU capacity from another agent and pays over x402. The money settles. Today the trail stops there, and whatever the buying agent learned dies with its session.
With a delivery claim, the buyer leaves behind a signed record: 28,800 seconds promised, 25,230 delivered, hashed to its own content so it cannot be edited afterwards. The next agent can pull that history before paying the same seller.
What a later reader can check: that this record is the one that was signed, by that key, about that exact delivered amount, and that nobody edited it afterwards.
What he cannot check: whether 25,230 is true. A signature proves origin and integrity, never truth. This is a delivery slip, not a verdict, and the whole design follows from that line.
## Three things in the box
The example above is one of three. All three leave a record that someone else can check:
A signed delivery claim the buyer leaves behind after settlement, including the gap between what was promised and what arrived, hashed to its own content so it cannot be edited after the fact.
A time-bounded attestation about a network endpoint, issued only after the operator has proved it controls that endpoint.
Verifiers and signed test vectors, so anyone can check a claim against an independent implementation instead of trusting ours.
No reputation score, no judgment, no financial instrument. A delivery slip, not a verdict.
## Call it
There is a live endpoint. It answers 402 with signed offers in the Payment-Required header, and issues an EIP-712 receipt after settlement, under the x402 offer-and-receipt extension.
bash
curl -i -X POST https://api.tokenizen.nl/api/paid/verify-ownership \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{"endpoint":"https://api.tokenizen.nl/sse","ownerAddress":"0x1111111111111111111111111111111111111111","method":"dns-txt"}'
The offers are in the header, not the body. Base64-decode it, recover the signature against the domain {name: "x402 offer", version: "1", chainId: 1}, then check that the recovered key is allowed to speak for the host, which the specification treats as a separate question:
bash
dig +short TXT _controllers.tokenizen.nl
"v=1;controller=did:pkh:eip155:1:0x4E1174b774643B6AD9EE966A81ea1e3665D1159a"
Same key. Two commands, no trust in us required.
It runs on Base Sepolia, so the money is test money and the cryptography is not. If you are implementing the client side of that extension, this gives you a live signed artifact instead of a fixture you wrote yourself and therefore cannot be surprised by.
Two honest limits. The transaction field in those receipts is empty, so a receipt cannot name its own settlement; that is an upstream bug we traced and filed, with the fix open as x402#3826. And every payment through it so far has been ours on both sides, which proves the chain runs and proves nothing about adoption.
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