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Star count
18 ★ · ajipurn/fida · read from the GitHub search API · (checked 2026-10-16 20:00:20)
Source
collected from the punkpeye/awesome-mcp-servers list · type: MCP server
Harvest history
first seen 2026-10-09 · last seen 2026-10-16 · seen 32× · listed by 7 sources
Score
score 703 · 18 ★ · 7 sources · mcp
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We filed it under these tags: MCP 服务. The tags come from the entry itself, not a taxonomy we imposed.
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repository ajipurn/fida;first catalogued 2026-10-09;last seen 2026-10-16。There is no official certification or quality rating here — we record sources and dates only.
**Keep secret values out of AI coding agents.** Fida is a local-first secret leak prevention layer for AI coding agents. It finds exposed credentials, gives agents redacted safe views of sensitive files and command output, and shows whether your installed agent integrations can still expose a raw value. It is deliberately **not** a general agent policy engine, approval system, or developer workflow firewall. Fida does not decide which ordinary commands an agent may run, which files it may edit, or whether you may use curl | sh. Its one job is simple: a detected secret must not reach model context. > Project status: MVP implemented. Fida installs local integrations, verifies its redaction path with a synthetic credential, scans repo risk, and records redaction-safe audit events. Quick start fida is install-and-forget: it wires every coding agent it detects, and running it again later checks for an update. Run from a terminal, the installer offers to do this for you; piped or in CI it stays quiet and just prints fida as the next step. What Fida does When an agent needs content that may contain a credential, Fida provides a sanitized view instead of the raw bytes: Its integrations combine three layers: 1. **Redacting MCP gateway** — fida_read and fida_shell return redacted file content and captured command output. fida_shell still runs the real command — the child process keeps the true credential, so the work succeeds — and redacts only the output handed back to the model: the agent *uses* a secret without *seeing* it. File reads are confined to the workspace by default, with optional explicit read roots for trusted user attachments; secrets outside those roots (e.g. ~/.aws) are covered only by the native-read hook on enforced agents. 2. **Agent steering** — a managed instruction tells the agent to use those redacting tools whenever it needs sensitive content. 3. **Native-read hook, where supported** — Codex and Claude Code can block a native read only when Fida detects secret content that the native tool cannot redact, then direct the agent to the gateway. Normal clean reads, edits, commands, installs, network access, and approvals remain the agent's and developer's concern. Fida's gateway follows the same low-friction rule: it captures and redacts output; it does not apply a command allowlist or repository approval policy. What Fida detects The built-in detector catalog recognizes dotenv assignments, PEM private keys, and high-precision formats for AWS, GitHub, Google, Slack, Stripe, OpenAI, Anthropic, and JWT credentials. It favors precision over recall: a credential in a format Fida does not recognize passes through unredacted. This is best-effort protection against accidental exposure, not a guarantee of zero leakage. Use a dedicated history scanner such as gitleaks or GitGuardian alongside Fida. Fida fails closed on redaction: if it cannot prove a response is clean, it suppresses that response rather than returning a partial secret.