A
AIops-tools/Proxy-AIops
Governed AI-ops for Traefik + Caddy + HAProxy reverse proxies / load balancers: routes, services, up
SECURITY.md ✓
View on GitHub ↗Link checked 2026-11-12 · HTTP 200 · opens the vendor's own site
Install & config
- Copy the command above
- Paste it as one entry under
mcpServersinclaude_desktop_config.json— local servers take command + args (example: clients) - Restart your client
Client config (built from the install command this repo gives)
{
"mcpServers": {
"aiops-tools-proxy-aiops": {
"command": "uv",
"args": ["tool", "install", "proxy-aiops"]
}
}
}Parsed from the README we fetched on 2026-10-26; we have not executed it.
command/args come from the install command the repository states. When it is ambiguous, the project README wins.
VS Code (.vscode/mcp.json - the key is servers)
{
"servers": {
"aiops-tools-proxy-aiops": {
"command": "uv",
"args": ["tool", "install", "proxy-aiops"]
}
}
}Same server, but VS Code keeps it under <code>servers</code>.
Claude Code (command line)
claude mcp add --transport stdio aiops-tools-proxy-aiops -- uv tool install proxy-aiops
Claude Code does not read a config file; add the server with this command.
Key names differ by client: Clients & CLI
- Star count
- 0 ★ · AIops-tools/Proxy-AIops · read from the GitHub search API · (checked 2026-11-13 20:00:50)
- Source
- collected from the punkpeye/awesome-mcp-servers list · type: MCP server
- Harvest history
- first seen 2026-10-23 · last seen 2026-11-14 · seen 26× · listed by 23 sources
- Score
- score 2,300 · 23 sources · mcp
- Install
uv tool install proxy-aiops
FAQ (answers come from our records)
How do I install it?
The repository provides this install command:
uv tool install proxy-aiops. It comes from the repository itself; we cannot guarantee it runs as-is in your client.Who is it for?
We filed it under these tags: MCP 服务. The tags come from the entry itself, not a taxonomy we imposed.
Who maintains it?
repository
AIops-tools/Proxy-AIops；first catalogued 2026-10-23；last seen 2026-11-14。There is no official certification or quality rating here — we record sources and dates only.# Proxy AIops
以下摘录自该仓库的 README（片段） · 在 GitHub 读完整 README →
Governed, audited AI-ops for Traefik, Caddy and HAProxy reverse proxies / load balancers — for AI agents (via MCP) and humans (via CLI).
> Disclaimer: Community-maintained open-source project. Not affiliated with, endorsed by, or sponsored by Traefik Labs, the Caddy project, HAProxy Technologies, or the HAProxy project. Traefik, Caddy and HAProxy are trademarks of their respective owners. MIT licensed.
proxy-aiops speaks to three proxy platforms behind one MCP server — Traefik
(its API under /api/..., metrics-text counters via /metrics), Caddy (the
admin API, default localhost:2019) and HAProxy (the Data Plane API v2 under
/v2/..., HTTP Basic auth) — with the same tools working on all three. Each
target in the config names its own platform; a name-keyed platform registry
selects the API shape (auth + resource paths), and an explicit support matrix
raises teaching errors for ops a platform genuinely cannot do — e.g. Traefik
writes point you at its providers (file, container labels, orchestrator CRDs), never
a silent no-op.
Every tool runs through a built-in governance harness (vendored, zero external
dependency): audit log, token/call budget with runaway circuit-breaker,
descriptive risk-tier labelling, undo-token recording, and output sanitisation.
## Why this exists
One server, three proxies — Traefik, Caddy and HAProxy in a mixed edge,
spoken to through identical tool names. Adding another proxy later is a new
platform descriptor, not a rewrite.
Read the whole edge — version, entrypoints/listeners, routes (routers /
caddy routes / frontends) with parsed hosts+paths, services and server-level
upstream health, middlewares, TLS domain inventory, traffic/error counters,
and the live config tree (snapshot + search).
Flagship RCA analyses — transparent heuristics that show their numbers,
never a black-box verdict: backendhealthrca (down upstreams → cause class
L4/L6/L7/DNS/maint + action), certexpirysweep (days-to-expiry buckets +
per-platform renewal hints), errorraterca (5xx share vs the fleet
baseline, dominant code → 502/503/504/500 cause), and
routeconflictanalysis (shadowed routes, dead routes, redirect loops).
Governed writes — caddy config set / delete / full load (the prior
subtree/config is fetched first, so the recorded undo replays a real restore)
and haproxy runtime server state (ready/drain/maint) and weight (undo
restores the prior value) — all with dryrun previews; delete/load are
risk=high with double confirmation at the CLI.
## What this tool does, and does not, decide
It delivers proxy operations — reads and writes — accurately and efficiently,
and records every one of them. It does not decide whether a write is allowed
to happen. That is the agent's judgement, or the permission of the account you
connect it with: give the HAProxy Data Plane API a read-only role, or scope down
the Traefik/Caddy admin API you point it at, and the writes fail at the server —
the place that actually owns the permission.
So there is no read-only switch, no policy file, no approval gate to configure.
The one thing the tool guarantees is that nothing is silent: every call, over
MCP and over the CLI alike, lands an audit row in ~/.proxy-aiops/audit.db,
> Disclaimer: Community-maintained open-source project. Not affiliated with, endorsed by, or sponsored by Traefik Labs, the Caddy project, HAProxy Technologies, or the HAProxy project. Traefik, Caddy and HAProxy are trademarks of their respective owners. MIT licensed.
proxy-aiops speaks to three proxy platforms behind one MCP server — Traefik
(its API under /api/..., metrics-text counters via /metrics), Caddy (the
admin API, default localhost:2019) and HAProxy (the Data Plane API v2 under
/v2/..., HTTP Basic auth) — with the same tools working on all three. Each
target in the config names its own platform; a name-keyed platform registry
selects the API shape (auth + resource paths), and an explicit support matrix
raises teaching errors for ops a platform genuinely cannot do — e.g. Traefik
writes point you at its providers (file, container labels, orchestrator CRDs), never
a silent no-op.
Every tool runs through a built-in governance harness (vendored, zero external
dependency): audit log, token/call budget with runaway circuit-breaker,
descriptive risk-tier labelling, undo-token recording, and output sanitisation.
## Why this exists
One server, three proxies — Traefik, Caddy and HAProxy in a mixed edge,
spoken to through identical tool names. Adding another proxy later is a new
platform descriptor, not a rewrite.
Read the whole edge — version, entrypoints/listeners, routes (routers /
caddy routes / frontends) with parsed hosts+paths, services and server-level
upstream health, middlewares, TLS domain inventory, traffic/error counters,
and the live config tree (snapshot + search).
Flagship RCA analyses — transparent heuristics that show their numbers,
never a black-box verdict: backendhealthrca (down upstreams → cause class
L4/L6/L7/DNS/maint + action), certexpirysweep (days-to-expiry buckets +
per-platform renewal hints), errorraterca (5xx share vs the fleet
baseline, dominant code → 502/503/504/500 cause), and
routeconflictanalysis (shadowed routes, dead routes, redirect loops).
Governed writes — caddy config set / delete / full load (the prior
subtree/config is fetched first, so the recorded undo replays a real restore)
and haproxy runtime server state (ready/drain/maint) and weight (undo
restores the prior value) — all with dryrun previews; delete/load are
risk=high with double confirmation at the CLI.
## What this tool does, and does not, decide
It delivers proxy operations — reads and writes — accurately and efficiently,
and records every one of them. It does not decide whether a write is allowed
to happen. That is the agent's judgement, or the permission of the account you
connect it with: give the HAProxy Data Plane API a read-only role, or scope down
the Traefik/Caddy admin API you point it at, and the writes fail at the server —
the place that actually owns the permission.
So there is no read-only switch, no policy file, no approval gate to configure.
The one thing the tool guarantees is that nothing is silent: every call, over
MCP and over the CLI alike, lands an audit row in ~/.proxy-aiops/audit.db,
Listed badge (optional)
Copy this line into the README if you want the listing mark. Optional, and it does not affect being listed.
[](https://anclum.com/en/s/aiops-tools-proxy-aiops/)
- Source
- awesome · https://github.com/AIops-tools/Proxy-AIops
- Browse by field
- MCP servers
- Listed by
- 23 independent sources
- added
- today
- Security policy
- the repository has
SECURITY.mdat its root (we checked that the file exists, not what it says)
More like this
Filed under
Every tag opens the full list for that filter. Counts are the live catalogue figures.