A
ag88/cmdshellmcp
cmdshellmcp is a constrained command-shell MCP server for AI agents.
★ 3·updated 2026-10-17
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We have neither an install command nor a public remote endpoint from this repository, so we do not print a config. A made-up one is worse than none. How each client wires MCP up →
- Star count
- 3 ★ · ag88/cmdshellmcp · read from the GitHub search API · (checked 2026-11-19 20:00:48)
- Source
- collected from the punkpeye/awesome-mcp-servers list · type: MCP server
- Harvest history
- first seen 2026-11-18 · last seen 2026-11-20 · seen 3× · listed by 3 sources
- Score
- score 300 · 3 ★ · 3 sources · mcp
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ag88/cmdshellmcp;first catalogued 2026-11-18;last seen 2026-11-20。There is no official certification or quality rating here — we record sources and dates only.README excerpt (English, untranslated) · Read the full README on GitHub →
# cmdshellmcp
Excerpted from the repository README (abridged)
cmdshellmcp is a constrained command-shell MCP server for AI agents. It exposes a small allowlisted Unix command set, somewhat safe file operations, patch application, and URL fetching so an MCP client can perform limited local tasks without unrestricted shell access.
The server is implemented in Python and runs as an MCP server using the fastmcp package. By default it listens on 127.0.0.1:8003 using the streamable HTTP transport unless --sse is selected.
Added setup files for a full featured Docker Debian based sandbox system container with cmdshellmcp (setup scripts, guides DOCKER.md, Dockerfile, cmdshellmcp.service unit file that runs cmdshellmcp in the container).
## [!CAUTION]
This server provides remote command execution (RCE), which is normally considered a critical security vulnerability. Allow-listing powerful commands—such as bash, sh, python, perl, sudo, docker, or commands capable of writing files—may allow an attacker or untrusted LLM to bypass intended restrictions and take control of the system. For example, allowing python or bash can effectively permit arbitrary code execution and file access. If the server lacks strong authentication, is reachable by untrusted clients, or is controlled by an untrusted or prompt-injected LLM, it may cause severe damage, including data loss, credential theft, malware installation, or compromise of other systems. Run cmdshellmcp \(cmdshellmcp2.py\) only in a protected, disposable sandbox with carefully scoped privileges limited to those required for its intended task and limited access to files, credentials, devices, and networks—for example, disposable Docker container or virtual machine that can be safely destroyed after use.
## Warning
This is a scratch / experimental app that evolved out of using an MCP server (tools) that allow running shell commands for coding purpose.
Unfortunately, for such a purpose, one often needs to provide the LLM (model) client with rather powerful shell commands to "do its job"
for a particular scope / context / intent.
The default allowed commands are not necessarily safe, i.e. LLM agents or practically clients calling
the MCP api can 'escape' and do things outside a context e.g. the working directory defined with --cwd
option. It validates the arguments in a limited way, i.e. looking for string path patterns if they seem to escape the current
directory. This is a heuristic check, i.e. this check is pattern matching, it does not know if that argument is intended to be a file
or directory. Nor does it know the argument's context for a particular command, or if they are after all safe.
e.g. it may prevent a ls / (listing a root directory), but sometimes that is what you need. But it may prevent by sheer pattern
matching e.g. rm /PreciousFile.txt i.e. remove a file in the root directory. This is not an always secure check, but added
as it is better than no checks at all.
There are also tools (MCP functions exposed) that expose write and file modification ops, including
executing shell commands.
Authentication is enabled by default. Keep the randomly generated token, or set
a fixed auth_token using the auth field in the config file or --auth.
The server is implemented in Python and runs as an MCP server using the fastmcp package. By default it listens on 127.0.0.1:8003 using the streamable HTTP transport unless --sse is selected.
Added setup files for a full featured Docker Debian based sandbox system container with cmdshellmcp (setup scripts, guides DOCKER.md, Dockerfile, cmdshellmcp.service unit file that runs cmdshellmcp in the container).
## [!CAUTION]
This server provides remote command execution (RCE), which is normally considered a critical security vulnerability. Allow-listing powerful commands—such as bash, sh, python, perl, sudo, docker, or commands capable of writing files—may allow an attacker or untrusted LLM to bypass intended restrictions and take control of the system. For example, allowing python or bash can effectively permit arbitrary code execution and file access. If the server lacks strong authentication, is reachable by untrusted clients, or is controlled by an untrusted or prompt-injected LLM, it may cause severe damage, including data loss, credential theft, malware installation, or compromise of other systems. Run cmdshellmcp \(cmdshellmcp2.py\) only in a protected, disposable sandbox with carefully scoped privileges limited to those required for its intended task and limited access to files, credentials, devices, and networks—for example, disposable Docker container or virtual machine that can be safely destroyed after use.
## Warning
This is a scratch / experimental app that evolved out of using an MCP server (tools) that allow running shell commands for coding purpose.
Unfortunately, for such a purpose, one often needs to provide the LLM (model) client with rather powerful shell commands to "do its job"
for a particular scope / context / intent.
The default allowed commands are not necessarily safe, i.e. LLM agents or practically clients calling
the MCP api can 'escape' and do things outside a context e.g. the working directory defined with --cwd
option. It validates the arguments in a limited way, i.e. looking for string path patterns if they seem to escape the current
directory. This is a heuristic check, i.e. this check is pattern matching, it does not know if that argument is intended to be a file
or directory. Nor does it know the argument's context for a particular command, or if they are after all safe.
e.g. it may prevent a ls / (listing a root directory), but sometimes that is what you need. But it may prevent by sheer pattern
matching e.g. rm /PreciousFile.txt i.e. remove a file in the root directory. This is not an always secure check, but added
as it is better than no checks at all.
There are also tools (MCP functions exposed) that expose write and file modification ops, including
executing shell commands.
Authentication is enabled by default. Keep the randomly generated token, or set
a fixed auth_token using the auth field in the config file or --auth.
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